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FACING 21ST CENTURY REALITIES
Judith L. Maute*
I. INTRODUCTION
ABA President Carolyn Lamm was prescient in appointing the Ethics
20/20 Commission to anticipate the need of changes to the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct by increased use of technology and globalization. In the
field of computer technology, "Moore's law" predicts that the number of
transistors on a computer chip double about every two years, although the
pace may have quickened further with the latest mobile devices.' During
the Commission's three year journey, it received input from diverse
sources, culled through many proposals, and on August 6, 2012 successfully
presented a set of recommendations to the ABA House of Delegates.
Standing alone, ABA Model Rules and comments have no force of law;
each jurisdiction must make its own decisions whether to adopt some or all
of the amendments, or make local modifications.
Part II of this article summarizes technology amendments in Resolu-
tion 105A and Resolution 105B's major revisions to the marketing provi-
sions contained in Rules 7.1 through 7.3. Part III briefly reviews the
deliberations and revisions of Delaware, the only state to have considered
the August 2012 amendments. Part IV compares the relevant current Mis-
sissippi rules and attempts to evaluate from a pragmatic viewpoint the fea-
sibility and possible barriers to adopting these revisions. Part V discusses
some of the precautions that maybe in order, depending on the nature of a
given law practice. The article concludes with an admonition that lawyers
must "get with the times." If they are unable or unwilling to adapt their
practices to the use of technology they are at risk of extinction.
Taken together, the revisions to Rules 1.1 and 1.6 will nudge practicing
lawyers further into the twenty-first century. For example, a small revision
to Rule 1.1 commentary expands lawyers' continuing legal education to
"includ[e] ... the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology." 2
Lawyers and firms will be expected to take reasonable precautionary mea-
sures to minimize the security risks posed to all forms of technology used in
the electronic transmission or storage of clients' confidential information.
Because of the rapid development of technology, an anticipated website
will reflect those changes, avoiding the need for frequent rule amendments.
* William J. Alley Professor of Law, President's Associates Presidential Professor, University
of Oklahoma. W. Todd Lockard (J.D. expected May 2014, University of Oklahoma College of Law).
Special thanks go to Andrew Perlman and Jim Calloway for comments on an earlier draft, to Lucian
Pera and Thomas E. Spahn for generously sharing materials prepared for various continuing legal
education programs.
1. Moore's Law Inspires Intel Innovation, INTEL.COM, http://www.intel.com/content/wwwleu/en/
silicon-innovations/moores-law-technology.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2013).
2. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 1.1 cmt. 8 (2012).
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Preliminary review of Mississippi's marketing rules suggests there may
be difficult internal struggles regarding possible adoption of Resolution
105B's marketing revisions or the risk of costly litigation challenges. Since
the United States Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Florida Bar v. Went for
It, Inc.,' many states responded with more restrictive advertising rules
which were then challenged on First Amendment grounds. A case recently
decided by the Supreme Court addressed targeted solicitations by lawyers.'
As a practical matter, lawyer regulators in most jurisdictions do not want to
spend scarce resources defending the constitutionality of such restrictive
rules, preferring instead to go after bad lawyers who repeatedly harm cli-
ents. Meanwhile, on-line companies entice cost-conscious prospective cli-
ents with do-it-yourself forms, or "we'll do it for you" like LegalZoom. I
urge states to abandon restrictive marketing rules and enhance access to
justice with reasonably priced legal assistance from properly licensed attor-
neys. In the twenty-first century, the competitive marketplace demands
that the organized bar not ignore the real threats to quality of justice
presented by on-line services that cause more harm than good.
II. ETHICS 20/20 TECHNOLOGY AMENDMENTS:
RESOLUTIONS 105A & 105B
This article considers the technology-related 2012 amendments con-
tained in Resolutions 105A, mostly concerning the Rules of Professional
Conduct on the terms of the client-lawyer relationship, while Resolution
105B pertains to marketing activities by lawyers. Other revisions adopted
in August 2012, contained in Resolutions 105C through 105F, are beyond
the scope of this work. Part A of this text relates to the former and Part B
addresses the latter. As a general principle, I expect the Mississippi Bar
Association and Mississippi Supreme Court will have little difficulty em-
bracing the changes in Resolution 105A. By contrast, I expect the market-
ing revisions will provoke significant internal debate among members of
the Mississippi Supreme Court, bar regulators, and the practicing bar.
A. Resolution 105A: Modernizing the Client-Lawyer Relationship
During the course of its work, the Commission received testimony and
comments from many interested persons and entities, and then sifted
through them, carefully gauging what revisions would be workable and ac-
ceptable to the House of Delegates and to local jurisdictions. As stated in
its memo introducing the proposed revisions, "technology has irrevocably
changed and continues to alter the practice of law in fundamental ways."'
Today, legal work is easily disaggregated among different law firms; there
3. Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
4. Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191 (2013) (holding that an attorney's solicitation of clients is
not a permissible purpose covered under the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994).
5. ABA Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics 20/20 Introduction and Overview (2012), available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrativelethics 2020/20120508_ethics 20 20_final-hod_
introdutionandoverview-report.authcheckdam.pdf.
346 [VOL. 32:345
FACING 21ST CENTURY REALITIES
are many new tools for marketing and business development; and the use
of technology facilitates legal work and client communications.6
Overall, the technology amendments addressed here are modest, mod-
ernizing the rules to reflect current technology and enabling them to ac-
commodate future changes without need for repeat revisions. Some
revisions are minor tweaks, such as replacing the word "email" with "elec-
tronic communications" in the black-letter text to the terminology provi-
sion 1.0(n) defining "writing" or "written." The revised comment on 1.0(k)
on "screening"-to isolate conflicted lawyers-replaces the word "materi-
als" with the broader term "information, including information in elec-
tronic form." While minor, this change is of critical importance given the
prevalence of electronic data in current practice.
Among the most important revisions is in renumbered Comment 8 to
Rule 1.1 on Competence, that a lawyer's responsibility to keep abreast of
changes in law and practice includes "the benefits and risks associated with
relevant technology."' Although a lawyer may only be disciplined for vio-
lating black-letter text, the new comment language amplifies the rule's defi-
nition of competence in legal skills. For the many senior lawyers who are
"digital immigrants"-born before 1985 and not yet naturalized citizens of
the digital world-this expansion may nudge more senior lawyers to retire,
adapt, or to hire younger lawyers skilled with technology-the so-called
"digital natives" born after the technical revolution began.8 I expect that
regulatory agencies will be conservative in expecting lawyers to jump on
the technology bandwagon or risk serious discipline. By contrast, to the
extent that courts consider the rules and comments as relevant to define
the scope of duty in civil liability, in high-dollar or high-stakes representa-
tions, the new comment language may have a significant impact.9
Another minor change appears in revised Comment 4 to Rule 1.4 on
Communication, replacing the sentence that "Client phone calls should be
promptly returned or acknowledged" with "A lawyer should promptly re-
spond to or acknowledge client communications." As Professor Giesel so
ably demonstrates in her work on Rule 1.18 and prospective clients, mod-
ern communication systems give new meaning to the word "talk," to em-
brace emails and other electronic communications. Given the rapid
development on the discoverability of emails, both Comment 4 and revised
6. Id.
7. See infra note 119.
8. See JOYCE RABY ET AL., How PEOPLE Really Use Technology: Current Research on People,
The Media, and the Message 23-40 (Mar. 22, 2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/ejc/
workshop_ preview_2007.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2013) (providing a PowerPoint presentation by Lee
Rainie, describing "digital natives" as persons born since 1985, as contrasted with "digital immigrants"
who were born earlier); See also, Ursula Furi-Perry, Millenial Lawyers, YOUR ABA, available at
www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/youraba/201211article0l.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2013)
(discussing value added to law firm practices from the technological skills of newer generations of
lawyers).
9. Spencer v. Barber, 299 P.3d 388 (N.M. 2013).
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Rule 1.1 Comment 8 heighten the importance of lawyers training their cli-
ents on communications that should not be put in writing and that employ-
ees do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when using an
employer's server."o
Arguably, the most important of all the August 2012 amendments is
new black-letter text to Rule 1.6 on Confidentiality, adding new subsection
(c): "A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or
unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating
to the representation of a client.""
Revised and renumbered Comment 18 develops factors relevant for
determining the reasonableness of a lawyer's efforts to safeguard confiden-
tial information against unauthorized access by third parties and unautho-
rized or inadvertent disclosure by those participating in the
representation. 12 The factors include: the sensitivity of the information; the
likelihood of disclosure absent appropriate safeguards; the difficulty and
cost of implementing safeguards; and the extent to which the safeguards
10. As a digital immigrant, I cannot imagine appropriate client-lawyer communications done via
Instant Messenger, Facebook or Twitter. Who knows what the future may hold. See, e.g., OHIO S. CT.
ETHICS Op. 2013-2 (April 5, 2013) (permitting lawyers to use text messages to solicit employment from
prospective clients, providing compliance with other advertising ethics rules); 29 LAW. MAN. PROF.
CONDUCT 238 (April 24, 2013) (labeled as "groundbreaking," the concept of marketing by text message
exemplifies how all lawyer marketing activities is gauged to reach one's target audience, here perhaps
personal injury prospective clients, based on police reports that are publicly accessible).
11. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c) (2012). Andrew Perlman, Chief Reporter to
the Ethics 20/20 Commission, has been surprised by how people choose different changes as the "most
important[,]" with some commentators agreeing with me on 1.6(c), others identifying the new comment
language in Rule 1.1, and others identifying the new Rule 1.6(b)(7) allowing limited discretionary dis-
closures of client confidences "to detect and resolve conflicts of interest" before making lateral hires or
changes in a firm's composition or ownership. Email from Andrew M. Perlman, Suffolk University
Professor of Law and Director, Institute on Law Practice Technology and Innovation, to Judith L.
Maute, William J. Alley Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law (June 3, 2013)) (on
file with author).
12. Id. Cmt. 18. Red-lined revised Comment 18 provides in full:
[461] Paragraph (c) requires a A lawyer must 1Q act competently to safeguard information
relating to the representation of a client against unauthorized access by third parties and
against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are partici-
pating in the representation of the client or who are subject to the lawyer's supervision. See
Rules 1.1, 5.1 and 5.3. The unauthorized access to. or the inadvertent or unauthorized disclo-
sure of information relating to the representation of a client does not constitute a violation of
paragraph (c) if the lawyer has made reasonable efforts to prevent the access or disclosure.
Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's efforts include, but
are not limited to. the sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure if additional
safeguards are not employed. the cost of employing additional safeguards. the difficulty of
implementing the safeguards. and the extent to which the safeguards adversely affect the law-
yer's ability to represent clients (e.g., by making a device or important piece of software exces-
sively difficult to use). A chent may require the lawyer to implement special security
measures not required by this Rule or may give informed consent to forgo security measures
that would otherwise be required by this Rule. Whether a lawyer may be required to take
additional steps to safeguard a client's information in order to comply with other law, such as
state and federal laws that govern data privacy or that impose notification requirements upon
the loss of. or unauthorized access to. electronic information, is beyond the scope of these
Rules. For a lawyer's duties when sharing information with nonlawyers outside the lawyer's
own firm. See Rule 5.3. Comments 3-4.
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adversely affect the lawyer's ability to represent clients." While this ex-
panded duty may frighten lawyers who are unfamiliar with technology, it is
likely that disciplinary agencies will focus on what safeguards are appropri-
ate for the nature of specific law practices and the stakes at risk. As in all
areas of the law, reasonableness can only be judged in context. The ABA
plans to construct a website that can be updated to reflect technological
changes. Thus, it must be stressed that the mere fact of inadvertent or un-
authorized disclosure or access to confidential information will not, stand-
ing alone, trigger discipline. A new sentence at the end of renumbered
Comment 19 leaves open the possibility that other state or federal law may
require additional action to protect data privacy.14 Overall, the technol-
ogy-related amendments should prompt continuing education providers to
sponsor programs educating lawyers about how to manage the different
security systems available, as opposed to frightening attendees with scary
stories about the risks. To appreciate the significance of new Rule 1.6(c), it
is helpful to step back and do a historical comparison of client communica-
tions, file storage, and the methods of practicing law and legal research,
contrasting common practices in 1980 (then) and in 2013 (now).
In 1980, lawyers and clients communicated by landline telephones, in-
person, written correspondence sent through the mail or by fax machine
and written phone messages. Today, cell-phones, smart phones, laptops,
and notepads are ubiquitous. Virtual meetings sometimes take place elec-
tronically using videoconferencing, teleconferencing services, and software
such as Skype or Gotomeeting.com. While virtual conferencing saves
travel time and money, unless adequate security precautions are in place to
prevent unauthorized people from lurking, sensitive confidential informa-
tion may get in the wrong hands. Detailed discussions among multiple ac-
tors often occur by email, with important legal consequences such as the
waiver of the attorney-client privilege if non-privileged persons are on the
distribution list. Inherent dangers abound with email communications:
they are easily printed, forwarded to unintended recipients, retained by dis-
gruntled employees, or servers are hacked. Unless lawyers and law firms
develop sufficient knowledge about the risks of technological communica-
tions, unauthorized third persons may acquire a treasure trove of confiden-
tial information about firm clients.
Client files used to be committed to paper and stored in lockable file
cabinets and placed in long-term storage facilities. Photocopiers replaced
the need for carbon paper. Today, modern computer systems store the
bulk of legal documents, whether in a self-contained law firm server, or in
one of the many cloud storage facilities. Cloud computing is defined as
systems that allow "the end user to access data stored on someone else's
servers via an Internet connection, rather than those located onsite. It uses
shared resources, including software and servers, to deliver information
13. Id.
14. Id. at cmt. 19.
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and services to the end user."1 5 The recent Global Cloud Survey Report
predicts the legal sector's interest will peak within three years and will have
"grand scale adoption by most law firms within five years.""6 Two-thirds of
respondents were concerned that their firms' use of the cloud would worry
clients." Security and client confidentiality was the greatest concern (over
80%), with data location, compliance, and regulatory issues also top con-
cerns."s As reported in the ABA Journal, the data reflected "A Split in the
Cloud," with 46% disapproving and 45% approving moving key applica-
tions to the cloud.1 9 Security concerns are paramount, and will require that
cloud providers be attentive to building secure firewalls impeding unautho-
rized access. Closer examination reveals that respondents from the largest
firms opposed, having already invested in equipment and IT infrastruc-
ture.2 0 Smaller firms, which had not made those investments, were most
keen on movement to the cloud.2 1 "[S]maller, more agile firms are leading
the way in outsourcing their entire IT infrastructure to an external cloud
provider."22 Despite the benefits of flexibility, mobility, business con-
tinuity, and cost savings,2 3 these smaller firms will have to develop the
knowledge base to evaluate suitability of individual providers. Professor
Andrew Perlman, Chief Reporter to the Commission, believes that some
firms will have difficulty adapting if they are not already in the habit of
taking reasonable precautions.2 4 BYOD (bring your own device) presents
difficult security concerns, with at least 18% of respondents acknowledging
15. Nicole Black, Introduction to The Tide Has Turned and the Cloud is Here: 2012 Global Cloud
Survey Report, at 4, http://www.legalitprofessionals.com/wpcs/cloudsurvey2012.pdf (last visited Sept. 19,
2013) (438 survey respondents from the following locations: United States and Canada (47%), Europe
(44%) and Australia/Asia (9%). Off the respondents, 36% were law firm IT professionals, 24% legal
IT consultants, 22% lawyers and paralegals, and 18% others.
16. Id. at 7.
17. Joanna Goodman, Getting Ahead in the Cloud: LITP's Cloud Survey, at 13, available at http://
www.legalitprofessionals.com/wpcs/cloudsurvey20l2.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2013).
18. Id. at 20 (firms with over 1,000 fee earners opposed).
19. Should Firms Move to the Cloud? Legal IT Professionals are Split, ABA J, Feb. 2013,
available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/should-firms-movetothe-cloudlegal-it
professionals-are-split/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2013).
20. Black, supra note 15.
21. Goodman, supra note 17.
22. Id. at 25. This finding dovetails with Richard Susskind's predictions. See generally, RICHARD
SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICEs (2008) [hereinafter
THE END OF LAWYERS]; RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORRow's LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR
FUTURE (2013). See also, Thomas D. Morgan, The Last Days of the American Lawyer 4-5, available at
http://jay.law.ou.edulfaculty/Jmaute/Lawyering_21stCentury/The%20last%20days.pdf (technology as
major factor challenging lawyers in United States, presenting risk of transforming lawyer work into
commodities and free availability on Internet of what used to be lawyer work).
23. Id. at 23.
24. Andrew Perlman, Chief Reporter for the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, E-mail from
Professor Andrew Perlman, Suffolk University Law School to Judith L. Maute, William J. Alley Pro-
fessor of Law (June 3, 2013)(on file with author).
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use of public cloud services like Gmail, Hotmail and DropBox for profes-
sional purposes without the firm's knowledge or approval.25 Free or inex-
pensive download applications are especially vulnerable to hacking; once
an unauthorized user gains access to a mobile device, it can pry deeper into
other databases thought to securely preserve client confidences. Given our
compulsive use of mobile devices, in which all technology adapters are at
risk of being "in a continuous state of partial inattention,"26 I predict the
time will come when many legal employers will prohibit the co-mingling of
personal and professional devices.27 Large law firms and firms that re-
present clients in high stakes matters will likely develop strict policies on
digital security acceptable use.28
Related to the new Rule 1.6(c) are minor changes to the text and com-
ments of Rule 4.4, on Respect for the Rights of Third Persons.29 While
minor in a linguistic sense, they are of significant importance given the "ex-
ponential growth in electronically-stored information."" Subsection (b)
imposes a limited duty on a lawyer who receives a document, email, or
other information when the recipient knows or reasonably knows it was not
intended for the recipient. This provision-itself controversial in the Ethics
25. Goodman, supra note 17; see also, Litter Publications, The "Bring Your Own Device" to
Work Movement (May 12, 2012), http://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/bring-your-own-
device-work-movement (alerting to risks on data privacy, security and confidentiality).
26. Linda Stone, a former executive at both Apple and Microsoft, coined the phrase "continual
state of partial inattention" to describe how many persons use their attention. See Linda Stone, Contin-
uous Partial Attention, http://www.lindastone.net (last visited Sept. 21, 2013). Some experts contend
this phenomenon, in which we have become "a nation of compulsive multitaskers," may alter brain
functions, including learning abilities, critical thinking skills, and ability to concentrate in depth. See
Kate N. Grossman, Stop Interrupting Yourself - If You Keep Multitasking-Talking on the Phone, Email-
ing, Downloading Music and Watching TV All at Once-You May Damage Your Ability to Think Deeply,
Learn and Remember, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, at BI. For more current thought on this growing
field of neuroscience, see also, Kendra Cherry, Multitasking: The Cognitive Costs of Multitasking, http://
psychology.about.com/od/cognitivepsychology/a/costs-of-multitasking.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
27. Cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 1.15(a) (2012) (prohibiting co-mingling of client
or third persons' property with that of lawyer). The international firm, King & Spaulding recently
blocked employees from accessing personal email on its computers because of security concerns, but
installed a special wireless network for those with personal laptops and electronic devices. See Martha
Neil, King & Spalding Blocks Employee Access to Personal Email Accounts, but Offers An Alternative,
ABA J (April 16, 2013, 2:30 PM), http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/king-spalding-blocks
employee-access-to-personal-emailaccountsbutoffersJ.
28. See Jennifer Smith, Lawyers Get Vigilant on Cybersecurity: Pressure Grows as Mobile De-
vices, Email Make Sensitive Data More Vulnerable, WALL ST. J. (June 26, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052702304458604577486761101726748.html (discussing sophisticated cyberattacks
against major law firms by criminals and state-sponsored hackers to gain sensitive confidential informa-
tion about pending transactions and undercut clients' bids and efforts of firms to improve security). Cf
BP CODE OF CONDUcT, http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/sustainability/our-people-and-values/
our-code-of-conduct.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
29. The ABA significantly amended Rule 1.18, on prospective clients. Because Professor Gei-
sel's Symposium article gives detailed consideration to that amendment, it is omitted from treatment
here.
30. Ann M. Murphy, Is it Safe? The Need for State Ethical Rules to Keep Pace with Technological
Advances, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1651, 1657-58 (estimating that over 90% of all information is created
and stored electronically).
3512013]
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2000 process-imposes a limited duty to notify the sender upon the inad-
vertent receipt of materials." The black-letter text of (b) added reference
to "electronically stored information." Revised Comment 2 includes sev-
eral significant clarifications. It defines inadvertent disclosures: "A docu-
ment or electronically stored information is inadvertently sent when it is
accidentally transmitted, such as when an email or letter is misaddressed or
a document or electronically stored information is accidentally included
with information that was intentionally transmitted." This new language
encompasses a wide array of inadvertent electronic disclosures, "including
email and other forms of electronically stored information, including em-
bedded data (commonly referred to as metadata) . . . Metadata in elec-
tronic documents creates an obligation under this Rule only if the receiving
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the metadata was inadver-
tently sent to the receiving lawyer." That sentence reflects the majority
view of ethics opinions imposing a duty of care to scrub metadata from
documents being sent outside the firm.32
Prior Comment 2 stated that (b) did not "address the legal duties of a
lawyer who received a document that the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know may have been wrongfully obtained by the send[er]."
Amended Comment 2 replaces the word "wrongfully" with the word
"inappropriately," thus, avoiding tortured analysis of when conduct was
wrongful as opposed to inadvertent. For some years, courts have struggled
with the definition of inadvertent, for purposes of determining whether to
allow claw-back of documents claimed to be protected by the attorney-cli-
ent privilege or work product doctrine, and whether to disqualify counsel
who used the inadvertently revealed documents.
A long line of cases address whether the privilege is waived by inad-
vertent disclosure in discovery, industrial espionage, "dumpster diving" or
other wrongful conduct by an opponent in obtaining otherwise privileged
documents.33 Depending on the circumstances of disclosure, modern
31. See generally, ELLEN J. BENNEr, ELIZABETH J. COHEN, MARTIN WHITTAKER, ANNOTATED
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr 432-34 (7th ed. 2011) (discussing controversy for doing too little);
see also, Andrew Perlman, The Parallel Law of Lawyering in Civil Litigation, 79 FORDHAM. L. REV.
1965, 1973 (observing inconsistency between amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26(b)(5)
and Model Rule 4.4(b)).
32. See Metadata Ethics Opinions Around the U.S., ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
departments.offices/legal-technology-resources/resources/chartsfyis/metadatachart.html.
33. REST.OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §79, cmt. h. (2000); Murphy, supra note 30, at 1652-
53 (now possible consensus that "inadvertence means essentially a 'boo-boo"' or a mistake); Merits
Incentives, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 262 P.3d 720, 726 (Nev. 2011) (case of first impression,
where Rule 4.4(b) not applicable, lawyer who receives documents from anonymous source must
promptly notify opposing counsel or risk disqualification under non-exhaustive list of factors identified
in In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. 1998)); Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 171 P.3d 1092, 1096
(Cal. 2007) (inadvertent possession of work product materials and subsequent use of warranted disqual-
ification); Burt Hill, Inc. v. Hassan, No. Civ.A. 09-1285, 2010 WL 419433, at *5 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (inher-
ent power invoked to preclude use of "anonymous source" documents raising "red flags" for any
reasonable attorney, but denying disqualification motion where counsel relied on ethics expert opinion
that retention and review of documents was permissible); Maldonado v. New Jersey, 225 F.R.D. 120
(D.N.J. 2004) (where no direct evidence on how plaintiff acquired protected work product, privileged
not waived, but warranted disqualification of plaintiffs counsel).
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courts may allow claw-back reinstating the privilege, and much damage to
client interests is already done because the opponent procured the underly-
ing information. In federal litigation, recent amendments to the procedural
and evidence rules parallel and give teeth to Model Rule 4.4(b).3 4 Rule
26(b)(5)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure more specifically ad-
dresses standards and obligations concerning privilege or work product
claims of inadvertently disclosed documents.35  Pre-existing language in
Comment 2 acknowledges that other laws may impose further duties.3 6
Five years ago, Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence was amended to
resolve long-standing disputes about inadvertent disclosure and to respond
to complaints about the "escalating costs of electronic discovery."37
B. Resolution 105B: Reaffirms Underlying Principles of Bates, Tweaks
for Marketing Technology
Most of this Resolution concerns marketing and communications with
prospective clients. Although the Internet existed when the ABA adopted
the "Ethics 2000" amendments in 2002, technology has grown exponen-
tially since then, warranting tweaks to reflect the newer forms of technol-
ogy and be open to future changes. The amendments reflect the
competitive realities of the legal marketplace, including the dramatic in-
crease in self-help or do it yourself online programs. I read the first para-
graph of the Commission's Report attached to the Resolution as
reaffirming the underlying principles of Bates v. Arizona.3 It states:
Lawyers regularly use the Internet to disseminate informa-
tion about the law and legal services as well as to attract
new clients. In general, this development has had the salu-
tary effect of educating the public about the existence of legal
rights and options, the availability of particular types of legal
services and their cost, and the background of specific
lawyers.3 9
34. See generally Perlman, supra note 31, at 1973 -75.
35. Id. at 1974.
36. "Whether the lawyer is required to take additional steps, such as returning the document or
in electronically stored information, is a matter of law beyond the scope of these rules, as is the ques-
tion of whether the privileged status of a document or electronically stored information has been
waived." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2012).
37. Liesa L. Richter, Making Horses Drink: Conceptual Change Theory and Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 502, 81 FORDHAM. L. REV. 1669 (2013); 28 U.S.C. § 502, advisory committee's notes (1996).
38. Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
39. (Emphasis added). Note 1 states the Commission asked the ABA Center for Professional
Responsibility to prepare an informational report on the constitutional limits to lawyer advertising rules
involving Internet.
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1. Changes in Marketing Activities & Evolution of Supreme Court
Commercial Speech Doctrine Relating to Lawyers
Some historical context is helpful in understanding the amendments.
Recall when Bates was first decided in 1977. Traditionalists were appalled
at the concept that legal services could be viewed as a marketplace com-
modity. Even then, all lawyers engaged in some form of marketing
targeted at the kind of clients they sought to represent; the open question
was whether those whose marketing techniques were not yet authorized
would be allowed to communicate with the 70% of the population having
"unmet, legitimate legal needs."o Disciplinary Rules under Canon 2 of the
1969 Code of Professional Responsibility heavily restricted lawyer commu-
nications about their work, willingness, and availability to handle certain
types of matters. Indeed, the fact that Bates and other courts held uncon-
stitutional some of those provisions was partly responsible for creation of
the Kutak Commission, which drafted the 1982 Proposed Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, and adopted as modified by the ABA House of Del-
egates in 1983.
The legal marketplace has been transformed into a competitive, com-
mercial market, partly attributable to advertising.41 In retrospect, the sim-
ple ad disputed in Bates pales in comparison to later outrageous or
hilarious television ads.4 2 Before technological advances, lawyers' market-
ing was primarily done through business cards, billboards, Yellow Pages in
phonebooks and their pricey back covers, newsletters, television commer-
cials, and Martindale-Hubbell. Now most lawyers have websites, some
have blogs, or use lead generators such as Rocketlaw.com or Martindale-
Hubbell's sponsored Law.com.
Social media websites like Facebook present numerous ethical
problems while the more professional Linkedln seems widely accepted.
40. Judith L. Maute, Scrutinizing Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation Rules Under Commercial
Speech and Antitrust Doctrines, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.O. 487, 531 (1986) (citing B. Curran, The Legal
Needs of the Public: The Final Report of a National Survey, at 228-37 (1977)) [hereinafter Scrutinizing
Advertising].
41. This transformation is also attributable to the proliferation of law schools since the end of the
Vietnam War. When men were drafted, women were first admitted in significant numbers; like Rosie
the Riveter, women refused to abandon their new toehold in the legal marketplace. Law schools ex-
panded their capacity, and new schools came into existence. Today, there is a crisis in legal education
because of mounting student loan debt and graduates who cannot pass the bar or obtain suitable em-
ployment enabling them to repay their loans.
42. See e.g., Jim "the hammer" Shapiro ads at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=05hn8
bhEpMY. He was suspended for misrepresentation in New York, see In re Shapiro, 780 N.Y.S.2d 680
(N.Y. App. 2004), and in Florida, The Florida Bar v. Shapiro, 914 So.2d 956 (2005), 966 So.2d 970
(2007) (reinstated); the popular Robert Vaughn lawyer ads purportedly cost $20,000 a year to run the
same ad in different jurisdictions; it seems they succeeded at bringing in new clients. See the ads at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7jK9FxEcAp8&feature=player-embedded. Wisconsin advertising
pioneer Ken Hur, whose hilarious ads projected a down-to-earth, polyester clad lawyer; his most fa-
mous had him wearing beads, long necklaces and scuba gear, asking potential bankruptcy customers:
"If you're in over your head, we'll put you through bankruptcy for only $100." George Hesselberg,
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Ethics opinions are split on the permissibility of using daily deals such as
Groupon.4 3 Today, the few lawyers who do not use email tend to be quite
senior and have support staff who handle their email traffic. Many lawyers
are finding that technology, while improving efficiency, may impair their
effort at work-life balance.
Since Bates, the Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed issues of
lawyers' speech. Early on, there were distinct lines between truthful and
non-misleading advertising which was allowed subject to time, place, and
manner regulations and in person solicitation for pecuniary gain, which
could be banned.4 4 Starting in 1985 with Zauderer,4 5 the distinction started
to blur. Zauderer placed a print ad targeted at women who may have been
injured by the Dalkon Shield, listing the types of problems it allegedly
caused, that readers should not assume claims were time-barred, that the
firm would represent on a contingent fee basis, and that no fees would be
owed unless there was recovery.46 The Court held that this was permissible
solicitation, presenting little risk of overreaching or coercion.4 7 It upheld a
public reprimand for failing to disclose potential liability for advanced
costs. 48 A few years later in Shapero, the Court granted relief to a lawyer
43. See THOMAS E. SPAHN, The Ethics of Email and Social Media: A Top 10 List, Hypotheticals
and Analyses, 206-11 (April 2013), http://www.nsba.org/SchoolLaw/Publications/School-Law-Seminar-
2013/The-Ethics-of-Email-and-Social-Media.pdf (answering "maybe" to question whether a law firm
could "offer the sort of 'daily deals' that have become increasingly popular", citing several state ethics
opinions that explicitly approved with qualifiers, including NEBRASKA LEO 12-13 (2012), MARYLAND
LEO 2012-07 (2012), SOUTH CAROLINA LEO 11-05 (2011); NEW YORK LEO 897 (2011), NORTH CARO-
LINA LEO 2011-10 (2011). But see, INDIANA LEO 1 (2012) (probably unethical and "fraught with
peril"); PENNSYLVANIA LEO 2011-027 (20111) (possibly violating Model Rules 5.4(a), 1.7, 7.1 and 7.2);
ALABAMA LEO RO 2012-01 (2012). St. Louis lawyer Craig Redler ran a Groupon for a simple estate
plan but was inundated with calls from other lawyers (myself included) on how it worked; it generated a
decent amount of business but cost him far more in time than the business generated. See Debra Bruce,
Did a Groupon Really Work For a Solo Lawyer?, SOLO PRACTICE UNIVERSITY (Jan. 19 2012), http://
solopracticeuniversity.com/2012/01/19/did-a-groupon-really-work-for-a-solo-lawyer.
44. See Scrutinizing Advertising, supra note 40, at 502-503, 505, 509-513 (discussing In re R.M.J.,
455 U.S. 191 (1982); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 477 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412
(1978)).
45. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
46. Scrutinizing Advertising, supra note 40, at 504.
47. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642 ("a printed advertisement is a means of conveying information
about legal services that is more conducive to reflection and the exercise of choice on the part of the
consumer than is personal solicitation by an attorney. . . the substantial interests that justified the ban
. . . upheld in Ohralik cannot justify the discipline imposed on appellant for the content of his advertise-
ment."). The Court upheld a public reprimand for failing to disclose potential liability for advanced
costs. Id. at 652.
48. Id. at 652. I have never seen a case where the lawyer actually sought reimbursement of costs
from a client when there was no recovery. Indeed, Model Rule 1.8(e)(1) now expressly permits reim-
bursement of advanced costs to be "contingent on the outcome of the matter." Model RULES OF
PROF'L R. 1.8(e)(1). Ironically, in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324,
1339-41 (2010) the Court employed the Zauderer standard to uphold compelled speech of lawyers and
other debt relief agencies.
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seeking to mail targeted solicitations to persons named in foreclosure ac-
tions suggesting they could delay foreclosure by filing a bankruptcy peti-
tion.4 9 Yet again, it found the state could further its legitimate interests by
compelling additional speech, such as having the envelope indicate it was
advertising material, and notifying the recipient where to complain about
the letter.5 o Throughout, the Court's standard commercial speech analysis
focused on application of the Central Hudson formula as applied to regu-
lated industries."' Justice O'Connor, who opposed advertising from the
very start, in 1995 finally persuaded a fifth justice to join what had been her
long series of dissents. 52 Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., is the watershed
1995 decision taken as inviting states to re-regulate lawyer advertising.53
Most ethics experts consider as "junk science" the data presented by the
Florida Bar to support its 30 day ban on all communications with prospec-
tive clients following an accident or disaster causing death or substantial
bodily harm. It found the state had legitimate interests in the legal profes-
sion's reputation, to protect victims and their families from privacy intru-
sions. Applying the Central Hudson test, the Court found the regulation
was narrowly drawn in proportion to the interests served.54
The Supreme Court's 2010 pronouncement relating to lawyers' com-
mercial speech is fascinating. In Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v.
United States, a bankruptcy law firm sought a declaratory judgment that
provisions of the bankruptcy code did not apply to lawyers because they
were not within the purview of "debt relief agenc[ies]" and hence not re-
quired to make disclosures to avoid misleading prospective bankruptcy pe-
titioners." In her second opinion dealing with lawyers, Justice Sotomayor
adroitly navigated the Bankruptcy Code finding that attorneys were just
like other service providers who provide bankruptcy assistance within the
49. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 479 (a truthful and nondeceptive letter, no
matter how big its type and how much it speculates can never .'shou[t] at the recipient" or "gras[p] him
by the lapels .. . as can a lawyer engaging in face-to-face solicitation.")
50. Id. at 477-78 (finding "no evidence that scrutiny of targeted solicitation letters will be appre-
ciably more burdensome or less reliable than scrutiny of advertisements [and offering less restrictive
alternatives] . .. to minimize mistakes [including to] . . . require the letter to bear a label identifying it as
an advertisement . .. or directing the recipient how to report inaccurate or misleading letters. To be
sure, a state agency or bar association that reviews solicitation letters might have more work than one
that does not.).
51. See generally, Margaret Tarkington, A First Amendment Theory for Protecting Attorney
Speech, 45 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 27, 101, n. 105 (2011) (summarizing the Central Hudson test generally
used in commercial speech cases, "just as it would for advertising restrictions imposed on any other
regulated industry").
52. Note her strong dissent in Shapero on the need to re-examine the fundamental underpinnings
of commercial speech doctrine as applied to lawyers which gave insufficient weight to the state's inter-
est in maintaining professional standards.
53. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc.. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
54. Tarkington.supra note 51, at 101, n. 105 (stating "the regulator must establish three prongs:
'First, the government must assert a substantial interest in support of its regulation; second, the govern-
ment must demonstrate that the restriction on commercial speech directly and materially advances that
interest: and third, the regulation must be "narrowly drawn.").
55. Milavetz. Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010). The Court's decision
was unanimous, although Justice Thomas did not join Part III of the opinion, which forms the heart of
the instant discussion.
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meaning of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection of
Act of 2005 (BAPCA). 5 6 By seeking exemption, the attorneys unsuccess-
fully claimed that they were special; in 2008 Professor Laurel Terry wrote
of a paradigm shift in which internationally, lawyers were being treated just
like other service providers. Milavetz makes that point for U.S. lawyers.
This holding then required the Court to construe §526(a)(4) regarding what
kind of advice was prohibited and whether the compelled disclosures of
§528 violated the commercial speech rights of all debt relief agencies. Sub-
stantial evidence supported finding congressional intent to prohibit advis-
ing a debtor to load up on pre-bankruptcy debt in bad faith for the purpose
of expanding the discharge, but that prepetition debts incurred for a valid
purpose for groceries, and other purchases "reasonably necessary for the
support or maintenance of the debtor" and the debtor's dependents. This
statutory construction avoided the need to address the First Amendment
vagueness claim. 59 The Court then proceeded to evaluate the compelled
speech using Zauderer and not Central Hudson as the standard, finding the
"required disclosures (in both Zauderer and Milavetz) were intended to
combat the problem of inherently misleading commercial advertise-
ments."60 Accordingly, the lesser standard of scrutiny provides that:
Unjustified or unduly burdensome requirements offend the
First Amendment by chilling protected speech, but "an ad-
vertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as disclo-
sure requirements are reasonably related to the state's
interest in preventing deception of consumers.61
56. Id. at 238. Her first opinion for the Court was Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S.
Ct. 599 (2009) (holding that disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege do not qualify for
intermediate interlocutory appeal). Renee Newman Knake alerted the academic ethics community to
the Supreme Court's new found interest in the legal profession. Renee Newman Knake, The Supreme
Court's Increased Attention to the Law of Lawyering: Mere Coincidence or Something More?, 59 AM. U.
L. REV. 1499 (2010).
57. Laurel S. Terry, The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: the Impact of Treating the
Legal Profession as "Service Providers," 2008 JNL OF PROF'L L. 189, 208.
58. Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 241-248. "Covered professionals remain free to 'tal[k] fully and candidly
about the incurrence of debt in contemplation of filing a bankruptcy case."' Id. at 244. Notably the
Court cited as Cf ABA Model Rule 1.2(d) prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly counseling or assisting
in a client's crime or fraud, but allows good faith effort to determine whether conduct is lawful. "Even if
the statute were not clear in this regard, we would reach the same conclusion about its scope because
the inhibition of Frank discussion serves no conceivable purpose within the statutory scheme." Id.
59. Id. at 246-48.
60. Id. at 250. See supra note 55.
61. Id. at 248-50. This standard makes imminent good sense in the bankruptcy context because of
other, often draconian, consequences if bad faith is found. Margaret Tarkington reads the case as pro-
tecting the attorney-client relationship because of its attorney-friendly interpretation and not from the
first amendment. Tarkington, supra note 51, at 34. I disagree. While Ben Barton persuasively argues
that there is entrenched judicial bias favoring lawyers, that thesis does not apply here because of the
Court's use of the service provider paradigm. See BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS
LEGAL SYSTEM (2011) and Terry, supra note 57.
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Another lawyer speech case recently decided by the Supreme Court is
Maracich v. Spears.6 2 The issue in Maracich was whether federal privacy
law allows lawyers to obtain state records on car owners to solicit potential
clients for an anticipated lawsuit against dealerships.63
2. Summary of Resolution 105B Amendments
For simplicity's sake, this section addresses the amendments in numer-
ical order. Professor Geisel's piece addresses Rule 1.18 in detail; for pre-
sent purposes, the only relevant observation is the narrower focus on
communications with particular persons about prospective representation.
No change was made to the blackletter text of Rule 7.1 Communications
concerning a Lawyer's Services. It was last revised as part of the Ethics
2000 project, with the language basically codifying the standard set forth in
Bates.6 4 The only Ethics 20/20 amendment to Rule 1.18 appears in Com-
ment 3, replacing the term "prospective client" with "the public," thus,
clarifying that the marketing rules applied more generally.6 5
Likewise, the text of Rule 7.2 on Advertising remains unchanged, with
several comment revisions. Comment 1 inserts language to expand the
purpose of advertising, assisting the public in "learning about and" ob-
taining legal services.66 Again, that idea harkens back to Bates. Comment
2 expands the list of permissible information to include the lawyer's email
address and website. 6 7  Pre-existing Comment 3 acknowledged that
"[q]uestions of effectiveness and taste and advertising are matters of specu-
lation and subjective judgment." 68 As amended, it adds to television "the
62. Maracich v. Spears, No. 12-25 (2013).
63. Id. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) might have predicted a different out-
come in Mariach v. Spears, 131 S. Ct. 2191 (2013). Sorrell invalidated a state statute restricting the sale,
disclosure, and use of pharmacy records that showed the prescribing pattern of individual doctors; like
the lawyers in Mariach, it involved data mining for commercial purposes. Id. at 2659. The Supreme
Court, per Justice Kennedy, held that heightened scrutiny applied because the statute imposed a spe-
cific, content-and speaker-based burden on protected expression, and that the burden was not justified
in the State's asserted interests in doctors' confidentiality, avoidance of harassing sale behavior, and
protecting doctor-patient relationships. Id. at 2662. Nor did the statute permissibly advance the state's
asserted goals of lowering medical costs and promoting public health. Id. at 2670. To my surprise, the
Supreme Court in Mariach did not cite Sorrell in either the majority or dissenting opinion. Instead, the
majority relied on Zauderer to uphold significant restrictions on lawyers' commercial speech.
64. As modified by the 1980 Central Hudson test used when examining a banned communica-
tion. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 7.1 (2000). Communications concerning a Lawyer's Ser-
vices provides: "A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the
lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material misrepresentation of
fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially
misleading."
65. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 1.8 cmt. 3 (2012).
66. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 7.2 cmt. 1 (2012).
67. Id. at cmt. 2.
68. Id. at cmt. 3. Indeed at a recent Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers (APRL)
meeting, panelists and participants debated whether there was any role for legal ethics rules regulating
advertising. As a practical matter, other laws generally regulate advertising and it is impossible to regu-
late taste. It was reported citation to decisions from the Second. Fifth and Eleventh Circuits that invali-
dated portions of new state rules adopted after Went for It. Today's consumers are smart, informed,
and have varying perceptions of what is good taste and what is effective to the targeted audience. See 29
LAW. MAN. PROF. CONDUcr 105 (Feb. 13, 2013), available at http://lawyersmanual.bna.com/mopw2/
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Internet, and other forms of electronic communication" as "among" the
most powerful media formats for getting information to the public, espe-
cially persons of low and moderate incomes.6 9 A prohibition of such for-
mats would substantially impede the flow of information. Finally,
Comment 3 clarifies that any real-time electronic exchanges "initiated by
the lawyer" are covered by Rule 7.3(a) on Solicitation.o
Significant revisions appear in Comment 5. Rule 7.2(b) identifies spe-
cific, limited circumstances in which a lawyer may give something of value
for recommending the lawyer's services. The amended comment defines a
recommendation as one that "endorses or vouches for a lawyer's creden-
tials, abilities, competence, character, or other professional qualities.""
New language permits paying,
others for generating client leads, . . . [provided] the lead
generator does not recommend the lawyer, any payment to
the lead generator is consistent with Rules 1.5(e) (division
of fees) and 5.4 (professional independence of the lawyer),
and the lead generator's communications are consistent
with Rule 7.1 (communications concerning a lawyer's ser-
vices). To comply with Rule 7.1, a lawyer must not pay a
lead generator that states, implies, or creates a reasonable
impression that it is recommending the lawyer, is making
the referral without payment from the lawyer, or has ana-
lyzed a person's legal problems when determining which
lawyer should receive the referral.72
As I understand this language, lawyers are free to participate with a
large range of entities that list the lawyer, location, practice areas and rat-
ings by others, so long as the entity itself does not state or imply that it has
evaluated the quality of the lawyer's services, or the suitability for the In-
ternet searcher's legal problem, or that it is financially disinterested. Law-
yers may complete a survey to get some preferential listing, and even
manipulate algorithms so that their names can appear higher in the list. In
reflecting on this from a historical perspective, it reminds me of earlier bat-
tles concerning pre-paid legal services and Super Lawyer or "Best Lawyer"
designations.7 ' That is, methods to attract attention of potential clients
3300/split-display.adp?fedfid=29667591&vname=mopnotallissues&wsn=497118500&searchid=20111
172&doctypeid=4&type=date&mode=doc&split=0&scm=3300&pg=0. At present, there is a circuit
split on the permissibility of trade names or mottos that state or imply an ability to obtain results,
making ripe for review that narrow issue. Contrast Alexander v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2010)
(upholding restriction) with Public Citizen, Inc. v. Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d 212
(5th Cir. 2011) (invalidating restriction).
69. Id. at cmt. 3.
70. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 7.3(a) cmt. 3 (2012).
71. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 7.2(b) cmt. 5 (2012).
72. Id.
73. See Judith L. Maute, Pre-Paid and Group Legal Services: Thirty Years After the Storm, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 915 (2001), New Jersey first prohibited participation in "Super Lawyer" or "Best
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which first caused great angst within the organized bar are now accepted as
commonplace.74
Finally, revised Rule 7.2 Comments 6 and 7 tweak the language con-
cerning pre-paid legal service programs, replacing references to "prospec-
tive clients" with "the public." 7  This is consistent with the revisions to
Rule 1.18 and Rule 7.1 Comment 3. Despite some scuttlebutt about possi-
ble pyramid schemes involving pre-paid providers, the Commission
avoided getting into the fray, leaving resolution to pending litigation and
the court of public opinion.
The only changes to Part 7, generally titled "Information About Legal
Services," blackletter text is in Rule 7.3, now aptly re-named "Solicitation
of Clients."" Both the change in title and blackletter text reflect the deci-
sion to distinguish carefully between duties owed to "prospective clients"
in Rule 1.18 and communications to the public at large as opposed to
targets of a solicitation. What I find most significant is that new Rule 1.18
Comment 1 finally defines the long-accepted distinction between targeted
solicitation and advertising to the general public.78  Likewise, revised and
renumbered Comments 2 and 3 reflect the lesson from Shapero that
mailed, emailed, and other electronic forms of communicating "that do not
involve real-time contact and do not violate other laws governing solicita-
tions" do not carry the potential for abuse "inherent in direct in-person,
live telephone or real-time electronic solicitation" that are banned; rather
the permissible solicitations help inform the public about potential need for
legal services and those lawyers available for such work.79
In sum, the amendments of Resolution 105B are quite moderate-lit-
erally tweaks to bring flexibility permitting adaptation to new forms of
Lawyer" programs in 2006, later vacated and ultimately permitted with qualifications. In 2011, the Eth-
ics 20/20 Commission announced there was no need to amend rules concerning lawyer rating agencies
even though lawyers and firms are ranked or rated by "hundreds of entities." See 27 LAW. MAN. PROF
CONDUcr 297 (2011), available at http://lawyersmanual.bna.com/mopw2/3300/split display.adp?fedfid=
20887943&vname=mopcnotallissues&wsn=498298500&searchid=20111704&doctypeid=4&type=date&
mode=doc&split=0&scm=3300&pg=0.
74. Maute, supra note 73, at 916, 920. It must be noted that the ABA, while a powerful trade
group, tends to be dominated by more elite lawyers who have the financial resources and institutional
support to enable their active participation. Certainly that is the history of the organization and despite
outreach efforts probably remains true today.
75. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 7.2 (2012).
76. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 7.3 (2012).
77. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.18 (2012).
78. New Comment 1 provides:
"A solicitation is a targeted communication initiated by the lawyer that is directed to a specific
person and that offers to provide, or can reasonably be understood as offering to provide,
legal services. In contrast, a lawyer's communication typically does not constitute a solicita-
tion if it is directed to the general public, such as through a billboard, an Internet banner
advertisement, a website or a television commercial, or if similarly it is in response to a request
for information or is automatically generated in response to Internet searches. I made that
distinction in 1986." See Scrutinizing Advertising, supra note 40, at 495-96.
79. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 1.18 cmt. (2012).
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technology. By emphasizing the value of greater public access to informa-
tion about the law is heightening focus on access to justice for persons of
low and moderate incomes.
III. DELAWARE TECHNOLOGY AMENDMENTS BASED ON
ABA RESOLUTION 105A
Given that Delaware's former Chief Justice Norman Veasey chaired
the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission and that the state was an early adopter
of those amendments, it is no surprise that it was the first to act on the
August 2012 Ethics 20/20 amendments.s0 On August 28, 2012, three weeks
after the ABA House of Delegates voted for their adoption, the chair of
the Permanent Advisory Committee on the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of
Professional Conduct received the Delaware Supreme Court's request to
consider them and created five subcommittees.8 ' They worked efficiently,
having only two full Committee meetings. At its first meeting, November
9th, the Technology and Confidentiality Subcommittee on Resolution 105A
reported need for further study on issues involving metadata and some
concern about the lack of bright lines defining what is "reasonable," espe-
cially relating to inadvertent disclosure of information in email communica-
tions.82 The chair of the subcommittee dealing with Resolution 105B, on
Prospective Clients/Advertising, facilitated the Committee's full discussion
and approval of those amendments." Before the final Committee meeting
held December 4, substantial research was done and distributed in ad-
vance. After further consideration, the Committee recommended the Su-
preme Court to adopt without change all of resolutions 105A and 105B.8
A November 5th memo to the Committee from the Technology &
Confidentiality subcommittee on Rule 1.6(c) contrasted differing views
about what reasonable efforts would be required. 5 Where the ABA Busi-
ness Law section criticized the Ethics 20/20's lack of specific, affirmative
minimum requirements, the ABA Science & Technology Law Section
maintained that "[i]ndustry best practices to create a secure system are
published and are well-known."8 6 It endorsed adoption of the new text,
noting that existing Comments 16 and 17 referenced a degree of flexibility
on reasonableness, and the practical difficulty of developing a "bright line"
80. Joan C. Rogers, Delaware Adopts Most Ethics 20/20 Updates, but Omits Proposals on Easing
Bar Admission, 29 LAW. MAN. PROF. CONDUcr 71 (2012); see biography of E. Norman Veasey at http://
www.weil.com/enormanveasey (2013).
81. Order Amending Rules 1.0, 1.1, 1.4, 1.6, 1.17, 1.18, 4.4, 5.3, 5.5, 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 of the Dela-
ware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct, DE Order 13-0003 (Del. Jan. 15, 2013); Letter from
Karen L. Valihura, Permanent Advisory Committee on the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional
Conduct, to the Hon. Randy J. Holland, Supreme Court of Delaware (Dec. 13, 2012), available at
courts.delaware.gov/odc/docs/ReportPermAdvComm.pdf [hereinafter Valihura letter].
82. Id. at Valihura letter.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at Exhibit C, at 3-8.
86. Id. at 5.
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test." To address this uncertainty, subcommittee Chair Robert K. Beste,
Jr. suggested possible revisions to comments suggesting that "what steps a
lawyer must take in given circumstances is the product of a subjective anal-
ysis of the peculiar circumstances that may exist from time to time, and
some presumptive language that good-faith efforts by an attorney are suffi-
cient to withstand" disciplinary inquiry." In the end, this proposal was not
submitted by the Committee for consideration to the Supreme Court.89
The subcommittee found the changes to Rule 4.4 and comments "entirely
appropriate" and merely reflect extension of the rules to changing
technology.90
Subcommittee member Diane M. Coffey prepared a memorandum
suggesting a new proposed Delaware Rule 4.4(c) providing "a lawyer shall
not, without leave of the court, take steps to uncover metadata when the
sender has expressly indicated, either orally or in writing, any intent to re-
move the metadata and the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that
the metadata contains attorney work." 91 Her survey of ethics opinions and
scholarship concerning whether a lawyer-recipient can examine a document
for metadata, concluded that the authorities are split.92 Two decisions of
the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed discoverability of metadata but
were silent on the "ethical repercussions of metadata mining." 93 Thought-
ful analysis found that a flat ban on mining for metadata would chill the
discovery process.9 4 ABA Ethics 20/20 amendments to Rule 4.4(b) address
only the recipient-lawyer's duty to notify the sender where the recipient
knows or reasonably should know the document was inadvertently sent,
and deliberately avoids recipient lawyer's ethical obligations concerning
the knowledge gleaned from said document.95 Ms. Coffey argued in sup-
port of a new subsection (c), consistent with work-product doctrine that
encourages lawyers to memorialize their thoughts with confidence those
documents would not be discoverable absent particularized need.9 6
Skadden associate Jessica Raatz prepared a supplemental memoran-
dum which confirmed the Coffey memo's "comprehensive overview of the
87. Id. at 7-8.
88. Id. at 8.
89. Id. at 9-10.
90. Id. at 9.
91. Id. at Exhibit H, at 1.
92. Id. at 1-4.
93. Id. at 3-4. An unpublished 2007 decision ordered production of metadata in a case involving
back-dating of documents where there was a particularized need for the native format; another unpub-
lished 2008 decision found that 2005 document production rules required a particularized showing of
need. Id.
94. Id. at 5.
95. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 4.4 cmt. 2 (2012).
96. Valihura letter, supra note 81, at Exhibit H, 5-7 (noting the overarching problem as "that of
'unringing the bell;"' once opposing counsel has seen the information regardless of any claw back the
damage is done). Proposed Delaware Rule 4.4(c) "specifically seeks to prevent attorneys from inten-
tionally seeking out information that they know they are not intended to see." Id. at 6.
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inadvertent disclosure of metadata."9 7 An eleven page attachment is a de-
tailed chart summarizing ABA and state metadata ethics opinions." On
the question of the sender's duty when transmitting metadata, the chart
reflected a strong consensus that the sender has a duty of reasonable care.99
Similarly, there was a strong consensus requiring the recipient to notify the
sender that metadata was found, provided the receiving lawyer knew or
reasonably should have known the transmission was inadvertent.100 It is
noteworthy that many of these opinions pre-dated the Ethics 2000 amend-
ments, reflecting that both the original and amended Rule 4.4(b) were fair
restatements of the law. The chart suggests why the proposed new subsec-
tion (c) did not gain traction; because the ethics opinions were about
evenly divided, indicating the issue remained undecided, and it made good
sense for Delaware to stay its hand."0 ' I surmise that adoption of that
unique provision might have caused unwanted problems to Delaware-
based corporations.
The Prospective Clients/Advertising subcommittee prepared and
presented a memo analyzing the amendments in Resolution 105B. Be-
cause Delaware had already approved the Ethics 2000 revisions, the Com-
mittee was fully comfortable approving those changes.102 In the end, the
Committee decided to recommend adoption without change to the ABA
Resolutions 105A and 105B.10 ' At least on these two components of the
August 2012 revisions, the Delaware deliberations were quick and easy,
consistent with the adage of "Veasey does it."1 04
97. Id. at Exhibit I, at 1.
98. See Metadata Ethics Opinions Around the U.S., AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, http://
www.americanbar.org/groups/departments-offices/legal-technology-resources/resources/charts-fyis/
metadatachart.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
99. Valihura letter, supra note 81, at Exhibit I, Tab 1. The chart identified 18 opinions total,
including ABA Formal Opinions, and those from Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Mary-
land, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Wash-
ington, Washington, D. C., West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
100. Id. The chart identified 14 such opinions, including from the ABA, Arizona, Colorado, Flor-
ida, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington,
Washington D. C., West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. Maryland and Oregon found no such duty and
the issue is not addressed by Alabama or Maine. Id.
101. Id. On the question of whether the recipient could review or "mine" metadata, seven opin-
ions allowed, nine opinions prohibited, and two found that the answer depended on the facts. Id.
Those allowing included the ABA, Colorado, Maryland, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.
Id. Opinions concluding that the recipient had an ethical duty to refrain from data mining included
Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Maine, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Washington D.C., and
West Virginia. Id. Minnesota and Pennsylvania declined a categorical opinion, finding case by case,
fact-specific inquiry appropriate. Id.
102. Id. at 3 & Ex. D.
103. Rogers, supra note 80.
104. Lisa G. Lerman & Philip G. Schrag, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAw 118 (3d
ed. 2012).
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IV. FEASIBILITY OF REVISING Mississippi RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTIONS 105A AND 105B
A. Perceptions of Mississippi Lawyers
During my brief visit to Jackson, I enjoyed Southern hospitality at its
best. Everyone with whom I interacted was most gracious and eager to
help in any way possible. In many respects, it reminded me of people in my
adopted home state of Oklahoma. Because Mississippi College School of
Law is a Baptist institution, I suspect its community of administration,
faculty, staff, students, and alumni are far more genteel than some from the
larger and older "Ole Miss" legal community. I understand that there are
only about 8,000 active practicing lawyers, whose licensure requires mem-
bership in the Mississippi Bar, which is a quasi-governmental agency sepa-
rate from but designated the regulatory authority by the Mississippi
Supreme Court.1 05 Dean Jim Rosenblatt gave me a quick tour of the town
and the judicial center, which confirmed my impression that legal practice
in the state tends to be kinder and gentler than jurisdictions with many
more lawyers. 106
The Bar produced the 2012 Economic Survey, packed with interesting
statistical data. 107 Consistent with national and Oklahoma statistics, about
63% of Mississippi lawyers work in firms of one to five attorneys. 08 One
third of the state's lawyers have been in practice 26 or more years, which
statistically is the cohort most likely to be disciplined based on national
data.' 09 This is highly relevant to the technology amendments, because, in
a definitional sense, they (like me) are all "digital immigrants" born before
1982, when personal computers first became available. Oklahoma General
Counsel tells of the increased number of lawyers who "stayed in practice 15
minutes too long," including one who used to be a very good criminal de-
fense lawyer who represented the underserved African-American commu-
nity. I know some superb senior lawyers and judges who cannot be
bothered by modern technology. As long as their firm practices are suc-
cessful enough to employ competent support staff, those lawyers can re-
main in practice indefinitely. But for those lacking sufficient work to keep
them busy and those who are sole practitioners, they must either learn to
105. Telephone interview with Adam Kilgore, General Counsel, Mississippi Bar Ass'n (April 29,
2013).
106. Email from Dean Jim Rosenblatt, Mississippi College School of Law to Judith L. Maute,
William J. Alley Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law (Mar. 4, 2013) (on file with
author).
107. 2012 Economic Survey, THE Mississippi BAR (Sept. 2012), available at http://www.msbar.org/
media/556969/2012%2OEconomic%20Survey%20Report.pdf.
108. Id. at 5.
109. Id. According to the 2011-2012 Mississippi Bar Statistical Report chart showing the age of
lawyers against whom formal bar complaints were filed, 72% of attorneys were 45 years or older
(45-54: 29%; 55 and over: 43%). Bar Complaint Statistical Report 2011-2012, THE Mississippi BAR,
available at http://www.msbar.org/media/247405/36d.pdf. Lawyers 45 years or older constitute 57% of
all lawyers practicing in Mississippi (45-54: 19%; 55 and over: 38%). Id.
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master technology or abandon the practice of law.' Last year, I
researched to moderate an ethics panel and learned that nationwide, the
paradigm of disciplined lawyers were those who were isolated, over-
whelmed by work load and life circumstances, and lacking an adequate
support system. That may not be such a problem in Mississippi, in which
many lawyers practice in firms with five or fewer lawyers and report under
1000 billable hours."' Surprisingly, over 50% of respondents claim not to
engage in any marketing activity." 2
B. Pragmatic Assessment on Feasibility of Amending Mississippi Rules
Addressed in Resolutions 105A and 105B
1. Resolution 105A
The Mississippi Supreme Court and Bar should anticipate relatively
little opposition to these amendments. Before the Symposium, I gave a
similar presentation to our Rules of Professional Conduct Committee
which only drew fire from a confirmed Luddite new to the committee and
unfamiliar with the rules. The Mississippi Rule 1.1 comment parallel to
ABA Comment 6 is identical to the prior version, so the additional lan-
guage on "the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology"
should easily pass muster by those formulating the rules. They should an-
ticipate pushback from some of the 72% of lawyers aged 45 and older. Not
knowing the state's process for promulgating new rules, I can only suggest
lawyer education."i3 The new Rule 1.6(c) requiring "reasonable efforts to
prevent" inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure, or unauthorized access to
client confidences might meet with greater resistance from Bar members,
which can be countered with good education about the problems firms
elsewhere have encountered." 4 Because Mississippi amended Rule 4.4 in
accordance with the Ethics 2000 revisions, I would not anticipate any resis-
tance to accepting the Ethics 20/20 revisions.
Mississippi did not adopt any version of Rule 1.18 dealing with pro-
spective clients, for reasons that do not appear of record. 15 I encourage
adoption of the revised rule because it greatly clarifies and avoids messy
110. 2012 Economic Survey, supra note 107, at 24 (survey shows 23.7% have insufficient quanti-
ties of work and 27.6% are sole practitioners).
111. Id. at 32-33.
112. Id. at 20 (survey shows 51.6% do "none").
113. The Oklahoma Access to Justice Committee has worked over eight years on a package of
limited scope representation proposals; during that time other bar leaders have learned that it has
worked well in other jurisdictions. In this instance, we have derived a benefit from being a "late
adopter," with Tennessee, Mississippi and most recently Alabama amending their rules. Alabama im-
proved upon our formulation of Rules 4.2 and 4.3, and prepared forms for use in civil litigation, which it
has authorized Oklahoma to use. We are awaiting creation of a new Access to Justice Commission to
avoid other political resistance.
114. Spahn and Pera materials contained references that firms did not self-identify for these secur-
ity breaches, for obvious reasons relating to professional reputation and potential civil liability. See
supra note 43.
115. See supra note 61.
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and expensive disqualification disputes arising when there is a claimed con-
flict of interest because a lawyer previously communicated with a person
about possible representation and now the lawyer represents a client with
interests adverse to that person. Perhaps even more important, Rule 1.18
gives solid guidance on how a lawyer should avoid getting too much infor-
mation from a prospective client before formal retainer.
2. Resolution 105B
Without question, these revisions will cause the greatest controversy.
It is obvious that Mississippi Rules 7.1 through 7.7 have consumed a great
deal of time with numerous Supreme Court amendments culminating in the
current version adopted in October 2004.116 The Office of General Coun-
sel immediately focused "on forming Policies and Procedures as required
by the Court and determining the Bar's role in the process."' 17 The Office
functions as a custodian, receiving submissions of advertisements when
submission is required; it does not engage in any pre-approval process but
maintains the records for three years. 1 18 These records are available to the
Court upon request.119 The Office also provides optional advisory opinions
under Rule 7.5(d).1 20 Primary consideration in formulating advisory opin-
ions or the rare Bar Complaint about advertising focuses on Rule 7.1,
which has been the subject of four amendments. This Rule's opening
clause prohibits "false, misleading, deceptive or unfair communications
about . . . [a] lawyer's services." The word "unfair" defies definition and
thus renders the Rule subject to constitutional challenge. 12 1 The Bar web-
site contains a long list of ethics opinions on advertising.12 2 Research pro-
duced only one recent disciplinary case on solicitation, Mississippi Bar v.
Turnage, imposing a four-month suspension on a lawyer's use of a non-
lawyer to solicit over 100 clients for prospective insurance litigation. 123 It is
116. Miss. R. PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1-7.4; see also email from Adam Kilgore, General Counsel,
Mississippi Bar Association, to author (April 30, 2013, 3:00 PM) (on file with author).




121. APRL participants debated hypothetical lawyer advertisement prohibitions based on rules
that were recently the subject of constitutional challenge, including those that "describe or characterize
the quality of services"; "promise results"; "[u]se visual or verbal depictions... [irrelevant to] selection
of counsel, including the portrayal of lawyers exhibiting characteristics clearly unrelated to legal compe-
tence"; "[s]tate or imply . . . [one's status] as a 'specialist', 'expert" or 'authority' in a particular practice
area"; "[i]nclude visual or verbal descriptions, depictions, or portrayals of persons or events that are
manipulative or likely to confuse the viewer"; or "[u]tilize any background sound other than instrumen-
tal music." See 29 LAW. MAN. PROF. CONDUCT 103, for discussion of APRL debate (2013).
122. Mr. Kilgore informed me that the Bar had completed a review discarding outdated opinions,
which will soon appear on its website. Telephone Interview with Adam Kilgore, General Counsel, Mis-
sissippi Bar Ass'n (April 29, 2013).
123. Mississippi Bar v. Turnage, 919 So. 2d 36, 43-44 (2005) (violating Rules 5.3(b), (c), 7.2(I),
7.3(a), 8.4(a),(d)). Turnage graduated from the University Of Mississippi School of Law and was li-
censed in 1991, long after the ABA adopted the original Model Rules in 1983. His ignorance may
reflect the widespread disrespect given to the required course in professional responsibility, a very
difficult course to teach a resistant student body.
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obvious the lawyer was unfamiliar with the relevant Rules of Professional
Conduct and promptly undertook appropriate remedial action after learn-
ing of the violation.
The surprising response to the 2012 Economic Study conducted by the
Bar perhaps can be explained because the voluminous Mississippi market-
ing regulations chilled honest answers or because the respondents did not
appreciate the many types of permissible marketing. Long ago, I formed a
working hypothesis that one can tell by the length and complexity of a
state's rule that state's desire to chill or prohibit lawyer marketing. 24 In
preparing for my talk, I compared the word count of Mississippi Rules 7.1
through 7.7 and the comparable ABA Rules 7.1 through 7.5, and found
that the Mississippi Rules were over six times the word count of the ABA
Rules.125 During my visit, I saw one of the television ads by a notorious
state lawyer and identified other more appropriate ways to discipline the
lawyer in question.126 If any local good can come from my participation in
this Symposium, I wish for a thoughtful, enforceable reworking of the cur-
rent rules that are both cumbersome and redundant. While the specific
contents of most the marketing rules are unobjectionable, streamlining is
needed to avoid spending precious enforcement dollars defending a consti-
tutional challenge brought by lawyers seeking to enjoin enforcement. Flor-
ida and New York can afford and are willing to defend their rules. In my
experience, it is rare for a consumer to file an advertising complaint; more
often they are filed by lawyers who are offended, or arranged for by those
the advertising lawyer is seeking to sue.' Besides the high cost of defense,
current United States Supreme Court jurisprudence casts doubt on the out-
come. Scarce enforcement dollars are far better spent disciplining lawyers
who repeatedly neglect client matters, causing untold harm to many poorly
represented clients and dishonest lawyers who steal from clients and
others.
124. See supra note 37.
125. Judith Maute, Address at the Mississippi College Law Review Symposium (2013). Word
technology facilitated this search, with Mississippi marketing rules having 5537 words and the ABA
counterparts only 851 words.
126. See supra note 42. Other empirical research establishes that personal injury "mills" do all
right for minor claims because the carriers pay out for nuisance value, but do poorly for bona fide
claims involving serious injuries. See generally, Nora Freeman Engstrom, Attorney Advertising and the
Contingency Fee Cost Paradox, 65 STAN. L. REV. 633 (2013). Arizona recently ordered a six month
suspension for inadequate supervision of associates and non-lawyer staff where it was impossible for
lawyers to represent competently all the clients; the firm employed 38 lawyers and 228 non-lawyers;
undoubtedly unauthorized practice occurred. Law firm manager is suspended six months for 'Hands-
off' supervision of subordinates, 27 LAW. MAN. PROF. CONDUCr 18 (2011). These mills also present
significant unauthorized practice issues where most of the work is performed by paralegals, other non-
lawyer employees, and law students with grossly inadequate lawyer's supervision.
127. That was the case in In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). Petitioner Edward Maracich was
employed at one of car dealerships and initiated the class action. Kimberly Robinson, Lawyers May Be
on Hook for $200 Million For Using DMV Information to Solicit Clients, 29 LAW. MAN. PROF. CON-
Ducr 356 (June 19, 2013).
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V. CYBER-SECURITY AND REASONABLE PRECAUTIONS UNDER
REVISED RULES 1.1 & 1.6(c)
When providing legal services to clients, lawyers and law firms must
take reasonable precautionary measures to minimize the security risks
posed to all forms of technology used in the electronic transmission or stor-
age of clients' confidential information.12 8 Lawyers should be responsible
stewards of their clients' confidences. The rapid pace of technological de-
velopment challenges the legal profession to keep abreast with it. The new
revisions provide general guidelines designed to address the many issues
arising from the integration of technology into the rendition of legal ser-
vices. This section focuses on revised Comment 8 of Rule 1.1, a new sub-
section (c) in Rule 1.6 on Confidentiality and its revised Comment 18.
A. Rule 1.1 Competence and Revised Comment 8:
Expanded Duty of Competence
Rule 1.1 addresses the duty of competence, the most fundamental duty
owed to clients. Revised and renumbered Comment 8 expands the duty.
As modified, it provides:
To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer
should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice,
including the benefits and risks associated with relevant tech-
nology, engage in continuing study and education and com-
ply with all continuing legal education requirements to
which the lawyer is subject.129
The red-lined additional phrase stresses the need for lawyers' ongoing
education concerning advancements in technology. The "relevant" quali-
fier might, but should not be interpreted to mean that lawyers need only
acquire knowledge about the specific types of technology that they actually
use to render legal services. Rather than continuing education programs
that frighten lawyers about technology's risks, it should be construed to
promote continuing education programs that familiarize lawyers with how
technology can be used safely, making their work efforts more efficient and
cost-effective.13 0 That would have the salutatory effect of making legal ser-
vices more affordable to persons of moderate means, which if publicized
well could bring consumers back to the legal marketplace and away from
128. Michael Downey, Law Firm Online Activity Policy, 19 PROF. LAw. 4, 19 (2009) ("Law firms
can and should take steps to mitigate their risks from . . .activity. This article and its sample policy
provide a starting point that, with education and reinforcement, should help a firm design and imple-
ment its own online activity or social networking policy.").
129. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.1 cmt. 8 (amended Aug. 2012).
130. See, e.g., Jim Calloway's Law Practice Tip Blog, http://jimcalloway.typepad.com (last visited
Sept. 25, 2013). Mr. Calloway, a nationally recognized tech guru, is director of the Oklahoma Bar
Association Management Assistance Program.
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self-help programs and other online providers. Lawyers who eschew inno-
vative technology are destined to go the way of the dodo bird, becoming
extinct by failure to adapt to modern conditions.
Revised Comment 8 supports three important takeaway points. One,
deliberate ignorance of technology is inexcusable. Two, if a lawyer cannot
master the technology suitable for that lawyer's practice, the lawyer should
either hire tech-savvy lawyers tasked with responsibility to keep current, or
hire an outside technology consultant who understands the practice of law
and associated ethical constraints. Three, lawyers and law firms are ac-
countable "for keeping reasonably informed about the rapidly changing
technology, security threats, and legal developments in the field."' 32 It
must be said, however, that there is no need for non-tech lawyers to go
ballistic, opposing local adoption of the amended comment fearing that it
will doom them to discipline. Rather, as recognized in the preliminary sec-
tion on Scope,
The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason.
They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes
of legal representation and of the law itself. . . . Many of the
Comments use the term "should." Comments do not add
obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing
in compliance with the Rules.3 s
Because Comment 8 is under the heading "Maintaining Competence" and
the first portion of the comment uses the term "requisite knowledge and
skill," that a lawyer should keep abreast of changes, there is a strong basis
to find an expanded duty. Nevertheless, no disciplinary counsel is going to
waste precious enforcement resources in isolated instances where a senior
lawyer is behind on technology but where such lapses cause no client harm.
These lawyers will lose in the marketplace but typically will not face
discipline.
By contrast to the non-scary probable interpretation of Comment 8,
breaches of amended Rule 1.6(c) and related comments bear risk of both
discipline and civil liability. These amendments link to competence by re-
quiring reasonable precautions when using technology for electronic trans-
mission and storage of confidential client information. A security breach,
i.e. any unauthorized access to or inadvertent disclosure of information, is
not an automatic violation of either Rules 1.1 or 1.6. Rather, it prompts a
131. See generally, Susskind, THE END OF LAWYERS, supra note 22; See DoDo Bird: Extinct,
BAGHEERA.COM, http://www.bagheera.com/inthewild/extdodobird.htm (for a discussion of the circum-
stances leading to the DoDo Bird's extinction, including loss of flight capability and food source for
sailors).
132. Jason Gonzalez & Linn Freedman, Mobile Devices and Attorney Ethics: What are the Issues?,
38 FAM. L. REP. 1163, 1164 (2012) (citations omitted), available at http://www.nixonpeabody.com/files/
141019 -PrivacyAlert_12 08_2011.pdf. Recall that the ABA plans to construct a website to provide
information and analysis of technology changes. If it is well-done, user-friendly, and has accessible
personnel to assist users, the website should allay concerns about potential risk of discipline.
133. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr Scope cmt. 14 (2012) (emphasis added).
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review of what measures the lawyer took to ensure the security of the in-
formation, considering the "totality of the circumstances" about the breach
and the sensitivity of the information the data contained. The next section
addresses what precautions may be in order, depending on the
circumstances.
B. Cyber-Security: Reasonable Precautions to Preserve
Client Confidences
New Rule 1.6(c) and Comment 18 firmly link a lawyer's fiduciary duty
to preserve confidential client information with the use of technology. The
revised comment provides broad and flexible guidelines on what may be
appropriate security measures in different contexts. The flexibility and
avoidance of specific requirements reflects pragmatism, dispensing with
need for further amendments as new technologies emerge.134
1. Types of Technology Used in Performing Legal Services
Increased numbers of lawyers use technology in their work. Whereas
in 2007, only 38% of lawyers used a smartphone, by 2012 the number rose
to 89%.135 Lawyers who use web-based software rose from 13% in 2008 to
21% in 2012.136 An ABA Technology Survey found that lawyers identified
the most important benefits of using software as a service solution in the
practice of law: (1) easy browser access from anywhere (70.5%); (2) 24/7
availability (55.8%); (3) low cost of entry and predictable monthly ex-
penses (54.5%); (4) eliminate need for IT staff and software management
(46.8%); (5) robust data backup and recovery (44.9%); and (6) quick star-
tup time (42.9%).137 The first two benefits also risk electronic security
breaches. Because information is easy to access and available at any time,
hackers have ample time and opportunities to gain access to the
information.
Lawyers use a variety of technological mediums to transmit and store
electronic data in their legal practices. Google Docs (46.2%) is a popular
document creation and collaboration system. Clio (12%) is a popular
cloud-based practice management system. Both involve storing many doc-
uments in the cloud for extended periods. SaaS and various Cloud services
are also used for document storage. Before selecting a storage server, law-
yers should obtain current information about their security updates. Other
devices used in practice include smartphones, laptops, tablets, desktops,
servers, and portable hard drives/thumb drives. The use of technology in
134. See supra notes 10-14.
135. Robert Ambrogi, PowerPoint Presentation, 10 Ways Technology is Rewiring Law Practice:
And What It Means to You, http://www.slideshare.net/ambrogilambrogi-firm-future20l2 (last visited
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the practice of law presents two separate confidentiality issues: (1) trans-
mission of data over the Internet, and (2) storage of electronic data. 3 s The
unique elements of the two issues require consideration when determining
which reasonable precautions are best suited to secure the information.139
2. Threats to Cyber-Security
In addition to its many benefits, there are also serious security threats
from electronic transmission and data storage. To protect legitimate client
concerns for confidentiality, these threats must be addressed. Threats to
the security of confidential information include attacks by hackers, 40 inad-
vertently sending unsecure data (either by lawyer, lawyer's agent, or cli-
ent), data corruption, and lax security protocols allowing unauthorized
access to data. The amendments require lawyers to take reasonable pre-
cautions as suitable for the context.
3. Possible Precautions as Reasonable Under the Circumstances
There are several proactive steps that can qualify as reasonable pre-
cautions to secure confidential client information. One method is data en-
cryption.' 4 ' TrueCrypt is a free encryption service that provides excellent
protection.142 Encrypting e-mails can prevent secure contents from being
revealed if inadvertently sent to the wrong party. Even if the Cloud or
SaaS service being used encrypts its files, encrypting data before sending it
to the Cloud or SaaS offers additional protection against anyone trying to
intercept while in transit and employees of the service that may be able to
view it before filing the data.
Another proactive step is to create a firewall, preventing unwanted
intruders from accessing your device. A firewall is at its strongest when it
is used along with an IDS (intrusion detection system) and IPS (intrusion
prevention system).143  You can use a VPN (virtual private network) or
SSH (secure shell) tunnel to transmit information securely. Both encrypt
138. Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm'n on Legal Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 2011-200, 8
(Nov. 2011) (citing St. B. Ass'n of N.D. Ethics Comm'n, Op. 99-03 (June 21, 1999)).
139. Gonzalez, supra note 132 at 1165 ("Cloud computing can benefit attorneys enormously, ena-
bling them to increase efficiency by 'outsourcing' tasks such as hosting electronic discovery, timekeep-
ing, case management, and billing. The entrusting of sensitive data to third parties, of course, can lead
to significant security concerns-for example, your data could be intercepted or compromised when
you send it to the third party. the third party could mishandle or misuse the data once they receive it, or
the third party may not give back or properly dispose of the data when the engagement terminates.")
(citing Cloud Security Alliance, Top Threats to Cloud Computing V1.0, (March 2010), http://
pub.bna.com/lw/cloudsecurity.pdf).
140. Michael A. Riley and Sophia Pearson, China-Based Hackers Target Law Firms to Get Secret
Deal Data, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2012-01-31/china-based-
hackers-target-law-firms.html (discussing that eighty major U.S. firms experienced cyber attacks last
year).
141. James Ellis Arden, Sharing Means Caring, 29 GPSOLO 76 (Sept. 2012) ("[E]ncrypt whatever
you're sending to the cloud-before you send it. That way, no interceptor, insider or outsider, will be
able to access and read the contents of your files.").
142. See TRUECRYPT, http://www.truecrypt.org/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).
143. Sharon D. Nelson, John W. Simek & Michael C. Maschke, THE 2012 SOLO AND SMALL FIRM
TECHNOLOGY GUIDE: CRITICAL DECISIONS MADE SIMPLE (2012).
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whatever data is being transmitted. A VPN hides your 'true' IP (internet
protocol) address, making it harder for anyone trying to track and intercept
the information to do so. A SSH tunnel creates a private, secure "path-
way" through the Internet from one computer to another. Its security is
enhanced by the fact that tunnels must be established on both sides of the
connection, i.e. both computers/servers. Consistent and secure back-up of
client information in multiple locations protects against a total loss of or
corruption of data at one location. This preserves the permanence of infor-
mation needed for competent and ethical representation.
Eliminating metadata144 from an electronic document is a critical step
when transmitting a document to persons not authorized to see confidential
information. While removing the metadata from the document is possible,
it has become standard practice to convert the document to a portable doc-
ument format (PDF).145 This removes the metadata, but preserves the visi-
ble data of a document. Installing anti-virus, anti-malware, and anti-spain
software onto devices will not stop a sophisticated cyber attack, but will
protect against most viruses and malware. Another standard precaution is
to have strong passwords or passphrases containing a variety of hex-
adecimal characters.146 Passphrases are more secure than passwords, be-
cause they require at least four separate combinations of hexadecimal
characters with a space in between each. The more characters and types of
characters there are in a password or passphrase the more secure it will be.
When using a laptop or desktop, there should be both a password required
at startup and exiting the screensaver. Password manager tools are becom-
ing increasingly popular as an alternative to remembering dozens of pass-
words or passphrases. These tools, with names like LastPass, KeePass and
1Password, allow you to create and use long passwords that are random
strings of letters and characters, which could not be remembered by most
users. You have one strong password to log into your password manager
and then copy and paste the passwords for all other websites and ser-
vices.147 Limiting access to confidential information only to authorized
persons is a fundamental fiduciary and ethical duty. By "implementing
electronic audit trail procedures," the user is able to monitor who is acces-
sing the data. 48 Mobile devices are often lost or stolen. Lawyers should
have passwords for all these devices and should install "find" and "wiping"
144. Gonzalez, supra note 132 at 1164-65 ("Metadata generally includes the identity of the author,
the date the document was created, and the program used to create it, and it also can include edits,
comments, and prior document drafts. This information can be highly sensitive and can easily be inad-
vertently produced, as much of it is hidden during normal document viewing.").
145. E.g., DocumentImage.pdf.
146. E.g., numbers, letters and symbols.
147. Email from Jim Calloway, Director, Management Assistance Program, Oklahoma Bar Asso-
ciation, to Judith L. Maute, William J. Alley Professor of Law (Oct. 2, 2013) (on file with author).
148. Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm'n on Legal Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 2011-200, 8
(Nov. 2011).
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features to the device.' 49 What is considered a reasonable precaution will
vary by each device and how it is operated.1 s0
There are many ways to exercise reasonable precaution in ensuring the
security of confidential electronic data. A lawyer or firm should combine
various methods, determining what is reasonable based upon the totality of
circumstances regarding the data, in order to prevent disclosure of or ac-
cess to information relating to the representation of clients.
4. Takeaway Points on What Precautions Are Reasonable
The Commission has stated often that there is no expectation of "one-
size-fits-all," but rather, what counts is as reasonable depends on the nature
of a particular practice, and the stakes involved. Because all of the Rules
of Professional Conduct are rules of reason, lawyers need not fear a draco-
nian response by disciplinary entities expecting all lawyers to have state of
the art, expensive and hard to use security measures in place.15 1
A prudent approach to successful technology security includes imple-
menting various layers of protection.152 By restricting access to the confi-
dential information at multiple points, a lawyer significantly increases the
odds that the clients' information is secure. Lawyers make it more difficult
for unauthorized individuals trying to obtain the confidential data. Also, it
lessens the likelihood that confidential data will be inadvertently disclosed,
because it would require the information to pass through a series of 'por-
tals' before reaching its final destination.
The use of technology to transmit and store confidential information
electronically brings new and unique challenges for the profession. The
technology revisions addressed in this Article are an important step to-
wards addressing those challenges. Their underlying purpose should not be
treated as establishing grounds for liability. Rather, they provide guidance
for lawyers in a profession being transformed by its growing use of technol-
ogy in the performance of legal services. The American Bar Association,
149. Gonzalez, supra note 132 at 1164 ("A 'find' feature, as its name suggests, allows the device's
internal technology to show its geographic location if it gets lost. The owner then can use another
computer to look up the location of the lost device and.. .retrieve it. A 'wiping' feature can be set up to
make the device 'wipe' or delete all its contents if someone. . repeatedly enters an incorrect password
or, alternatively, can allow the user to send a command to the lost device instructing it to immediately
delete its contents.").
150. Id. at 1167 ("Each of these technologies presents unique security vulnerabilities: for example,
Bluetooth exploits have been reported that allow hackers, by simply standing near a Bluetooth-enabled
mobile device, to run malicious software that can surreptitiously read the victim's phone call lists, text
messages, photographs, calendars, contacts, and even make long-distance phone calls using the victim's
device.").
151. ABA COMMIsSION ON ETHics 20/20 RESOLUTION 105A AND REPORT at 3, available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics 2020/2012hod-annual-meeting_105a.
authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).
152. Examples of measures one can use to heighten technology security include the following:
installing a firewall, anti-malware and anti-virus software, and encrypting confidential data; limiting
access to confidential information; vigilant monitoring of security; proper training; placing legally bind-
ing obligations on service providers; having recovery methods in place; backing up confidential infor-
mation on a secure, offline medium; and immediately notifying all parties whose interest are affected
when a security breach occurs.
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besides approving these revisions, is undertaking to educate lawyers on
cyber-security.' 53 Regardless of whether a jurisdiction adopts all the revi-
sions, to keep up with the changing times and function in modern society,
lawyers must begin taking reasonable precautions to minimize the security
risks threatening electronically transmitted and stored data relating to the
representation of clients.
VI. CONCLUSION: LAWYERS MUST GET WITH THE TECHNOLOGY
PROGRAM OR RISK OBSOLESCENCE
In today's practice environment, there is no room for technophobes.
The path-breaking work of Richard Susskind, Thomas Morgan, and others
are bringing home in no uncertain terms, that the practice of law is under-
going profound changes. Only a small amount of legal work is "bespoke"
in the sense used by Susskind, one-to-one, hand-crafted, "highly tailored
for the specific needs of particular clients" and not later recycled.154 For
law firms and individual lawyers to stay in business, earning enough for a
comfortable life and repaid student loans, they must create standardized,
then systematized work programs packaged to sell to multiple clients, re-
quiring limited individualized revisions.1"' It is imperative that law schools
start preparing current students for their inevitable future.s 6
We all must learn to manage technology or it will destroy us. I think of
the computer Hal in Stanley Kubrick's 1968 movie "2001: A Space Odys-
sey," in which the spaceship computer destroyed the universe. As Dave,
the captain instructed HAL to open the pod bay doors, HAL responded
"I'm sorry Dave. I'm afraid I can't do that." HAL knew that there were
plans to disconnect him.'15 The film ends with a moonshot with a human
embryo enclosed, suggesting that humankind creates technology that will
destroy it when humans do not keep pace with the technology. 58
153. James Podgers, Raising the Alarm: ABA President Urges Lawyers to Recognize, Respond to
Threat of Cyberattacks, 99 ABA 2, 55 (2013) ("Among other efforts. Bellows says, the ABA is produc-
ing a guidebook on how to protect electronic files from cyber attacks. The association also is planning
to offer members more CLE programs concerning cyber security and is creating a Web portal that will
contain educational materials.").
154. See Susskind, THE END OF LAWYERS, supra note 22 at 18, 29.
155. Id. chart at 29, 269 (chart forecasting to 2018).
156. See generally, DAVID 1. C. THOMSON, LAW SCHOOL 2.0: LEGAL EDUCATION FOR A DIGITAL
AGE (MATCHEw BENDER & CO. 2009).
157. 2001: A Space Odyssey: Quotes, IMDb, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0062622/quotes?ref_=
ITql 3.
158. Many lawyers have experienced HAL. He entered my life April 10, 2010 and was a resilient
beast to kill. While I had fun on a Friday afternoon, IT staff installed a new computer and program.
The next week I brought my laptop to a bar meeting and tried to access the agenda I had prepared, but
when I tried to get my email, HAL said I was not an authorized user. IT had to uninstall the new
computer in order to fix the problem. Busy lawyers under time restraints cannot afford the stress of
such incidents.
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